Breakdown: Boston's bench costs them Game 2

In an attempt to find a scapegoat for the Celtics devastating home loss last night in Game 2 of the Eastern Conference championship series, a lot of people are pointing the finger at Rajon Rondo. That is wrong. Rondo was actually excellent. By my calculations, he slightly outplayed his counterpart, Chauncey Billups. In fact, using the Win Contribution metric, the entire Celtic starting five thoroughly whipped the Piston starting five. It was the Celtic bench that gave the game back to the visitors.

By WC tally, had the game been a 5-on-5 contest at the Y, the Celtics would have won easily. Their starting five had a combined Win Contribution of +3.233 (led by Kevin Garnett's +1.333, Rajon Rondo's +0.923, and Ray Allen's +0.800) to the Pistons starting fives' Win Contribution of +1.837 (led by Chauncey Billups +0.787, and dragged down by Tayshaun Prince's -0.330).

But as I stated earlier in the season when I assessed the strength of each NBA team's bench production, it is the collective job of the starters to build a Win Contribution advantage... the bench's job is to do as little as possible to erode that advantage away. Last night, the Celtics bench produced an avalanche of erosion.

In 33 minutes of action, or nearly 14% of the Celtics player minutes in last nights game, the Fantastically Bad Four of James Posey, Eddie House, Glen Davis, and Tony Allen combined to produce 4 points, 8 missed field goals, 3 missed free throws, 0 rebounds, 0 assists, 0 steals, 1 turnover, and 5 fouls. Thank goodness for the fouls and missed shots or we may have no record at all that any of them participated in the game.

When adjusted to account for position, then, the four combined to produce a staggeringly negative Win Contribution of -2.783. The entire Celtics bench accounted for a negative Win Contribution of -2.679 (PJ Brown and Leon Powe made positive contributions).

The Pistons bench, on the other hand, combined to produce a negative Win Contribution of only -0.335, which, when combined with the poor work done by the Celtics bench, completely made up the "stagger" and then some. The Pistons overall Win Contribution, then, was around +1.304, while the Celtics was approximately +0.594. And the Pistons took Game 2 on the Celtics home court.

This year's draft looks inverted, Antlerheads

NOTE: Before I get started with my lottery evaluation, a special shout out to the world's newest Milwaukee Bucks fan, and future lottery prospect -- who is sure to have a deadly set-shot release -- my nephew Henry David... born Saturday night in the Land of the Lakers, Minnesota. Welcome to a Green-and-Red World, Hammer! (He may live in Minnesota, but he bleeds Green and Red. In fact, he comes from a long line of crazed Antlerheads. His grandfather and middle-namesake famously snuck out of the house to attend a Bucks game with his Jaycee buddies when Henry's old man (my brother Todd) was 3 days old and sick with Billy Rubin (sp?)! That's Green and Redication, y'all!! Hold on... I'm going to look up who they were playing on basketball-reference... I'm back... Ho, ho... its a true story!! Its been confirmed!! 3 days after Henry's dad was born happens to have been a Saturday night -- which completely fits the "Jaycees Outing" angle of the story -- and the Bucks indeed were playing at home against the Houston Rockets. By the way, the Green and Red prevailed, 126-101. And now you know the rest of the story. On with the show...)

Slim Pickins at the Top, Fats Domino at the Bottom

This lottery looks a little bare. Of the consensus top 17 prospects, I see 3 definite "players", 3 other "possibilities", and 11 guys I wouldn't draft for my noontime YMCA team. Now, what are the odds the Bucks will end up with a stiff?

The Big Timers (I've already commented on these 3 players ad infinitum and will not repeat my analysis here, except to say that while you guys all laugh at Kevin Love, I guarantee he will be a contributor in the NBA which is more than I can say for most of the top prospects. If the Bucks get a contributor in this draft I will be ecstatic).

1. Derrick Rose
2. Michael Beasley
3. Kevin Love

Sort of/ Maybes

1. OJ Mayo: I'm pushing it here. His college numbers were low, but I'm going to give him the benefit of the doubt because he may be able to score more easily when his role becomes diminshed, and he has the ideal size and strength to rebound and defend out of the 2 hole.
2. Anthony Randolph: This recommendation is contingent upon position. If he is slotted at the 3, as some are suggesting he will be, he has the length and the rebounding to produce above average numbers on offense, and to be a force on defense. But I am skeptical. The NBA rarely allows players who are tall enough to play power forward play small forward, no matter how weak they may be. This is especially true when the player has no perimeter game, which Randolph lacks.
3. Donta Green: Take the Randolph analysis and just substitute the name Donta Green.

Buster Browns (Get out of town)

1. Brooke Lopez: Why is this guy so highly coveted? Applying history to his collegiate production almost assures us he will be a big, big bust. What is there to like about him? He doesn't shoot well at all for a big man (under 50%). He's passive. He doesn't rebound. He's passive. He turns the ball over. He's passive. Are you getting the picture? He stinks. Didn't anyone watch the NCAAs?
2. Jerryd Bayless: What the hell? People... people... undersized shooting guards who can't shoot and aren't strong and have no history of playing the point DON'T WORK OUT EVER!! I don't care how "freaky athletic" he is, or how fast he can run the shuttle, or whatever. He didn't produce good numbers in college, and the meager numbers he did produce are heavily skewed due to Bayless' love of the easy college 3. So, what I am saying is his college production was subpar... WHAT THE HELL MAKES YOU THINK HE WILL DO BETTER IN THE NBA? And I haven't even addressed the defensive trouble he is sure to have.
3. Eric Gordon: Can we get a consistent height record on this kid? Half the world calls him 6'4'' the honest half has him at 6'3'', and I'll bet you dollars to donuts he's no better than 6'1 1/2 in stocking feet. Okay, once again, lets review this "top" prospect. He shoots the ball extremely poorly (45%). He couldn't even hit the NBA 3 point average (35%) from college distance (he shot 33.4% from college 3). Think he'll get better in the NBA? Think again. In fact, think TJ Ford. So, we have a "scorer" who's undersized and can't shoot from the outside very well. Brilliant. He must do something well. He's a top ten consensus pick. Well, lets see... he doesn't rebound A LICK. His board totals would embarass Mugsy Bogues. He doesn't seem to pass either, and he's not a good ballhandler. Oh, but he does have an above average turnover rate. Yeah, he's a hell of a prospect.
4. Danilo Ganillari: I heard this foreign bud, who stands 6'9'' and weighs all of 209 pounds... that's not a typo... say he wants to be one of the best players on the planet. If he's speaking about Mars or Venus or one of the other unihabitated planets in the solar system, I'd give him a 50/50 shot at reaching his goal. But on Earth he sucks. To put a Dennis Leary emphasis on it... he suuuuccccckkkkks. This foreign born softy doesn't rebound at all, nor does he ever venture into the paint. He shoots the 3 okay, but he hasn't had an NBAer choking his air space yet, either. Oh, and he doesn't pass. And I'm going to venture to say he plays no defense.

All right, I'm getting bored. Let me rush to the finish... the two point guards are lesser versions of TJ Ford with not as good a jumpshot (sarcasm). Kosta Koufus is one of these big men who never, ever ventures into the paint. Darrel Arthur is way too small to play the power forward in the NBA and he doesn't shoot well enough to play the 3.

All in all, this year's lottery stinks.

I actually think all of the good picks are, ironically, down the draft board. Joe Alexander looks like a producer, as does Mareese Spaights and Chris Douglas Roberts. And the big sleeper of all of them doesn't even show up on draftexpress.com's board until the second round... Ryan Anderson, small forward and bigtime producer from California.

Anderson rebounds very well, he shoots it well, he produced at an incredible rate. If he projects at power forward, the only thing that could slow him down is his strength. If he projects as a small forward, nothing will slow him down on offense, but I suspect he will struggle on defense.

Anyway, projecting his college numbers to the pros, Anderson would be a slightly below average power forward and a well above average small forward. I'd seriously rather take this guy and give him a shot at the 3 rather than selecting anyone the Bucks would likely select at 8.

Then you've got JR Giddens (I'm looking at some of these guys, literally, for the first time). His numbers for a shooting guard are off the charts. What is he doing in the second round while Eric Gordon is in the first? He shoots better, produces way, way, better. Has better size, more experience... I'm beginning to believe the "Eyeball" prospects are all in the overvalued lottery whereas the "Productive" prospects are all undervalued members of the second round. Wow

I haven't even gotten to rebound machine Richard Hendrix yet. But I"m going to stop here for the night with this thought... the Bucks have to trade out of the lottery. The gold is all down stream!

The tired old Lottery and some other tired things about the Association

You know how excited I was for tonight's lottery? I did some work instead. And, surprise, the Bucks fell a spot. What a joke.

The whole concept of the lottery is getting on my nerves. Its a gimmick that's gotten extremely tired and needs to be put to rest, like so many other things in the modern NBA. Go back to the old coin flip. It served the Association just fine for 15 or so years, and its a hell of a lot more fair than the lottery farce. So get rid of it, David Stern. And while you're at it, please also eliminate the following:

1) The Dunk Contest, I haven't watched one single dunk contest since Dee Brown pumped up his shoes, and I don't intend to again;

2) The 3 Point contest, have not watched since Bird;

3) Any kind of contest associated with All-Star weekend;

4) Having player's appear on the scoreboard to urge the crowd to make noise;

5) The faux Chicago Bulls introductions every single damn team does before every single damn game;

6) the T-Shirt Gun -- the gun doesn't even reach the real fans in most arenas;

7) Coaches using the phrase "energy," or blaming losses on the team's failure to "compete" or failure to "execute" or any other damn cliche that has absolutely no explanatory meaning whatsoever;

8) blaring rock music at every NBA arena instead of playing the jazzified sound of Streetlife or just a simple organ;

9) wildly overvaluing guys who are athletic but, ooops, can't play a lick of basketball...

I could go on all night. But I still love the NBA.

Celtic fans shouldn't blame it all on Ray

Ray Allen's postseason offensive contributions to the Boston Celtics have been almost nonexistent. But, believe it or not, his lack of production is not the primary reason the Celtics have devolved from an invincible regular season team to a vulnerable postseason team. The blame for that is better placed with the duo of Paul Pierce and Leon Powe.

Here's how I came to that conclusion. I first calculated the offensive and defensive postseason Win Scores for every member of the Boston Celtics. I then converted those numbers into each player's postseason "Win Contributions" by comparing the Win Scores to the NBA averages and then multiplying that result by the player's percentage of overall postseason playing time. (For instance, if the player's offensive Win Score was 2.1 points above the NBA average for his position and he played 13% of the Celtics overall playoff minutes, then his offensive Win Contribution was +0.273. As always, +0.000 represents the contribution that could be expected from an average NBA player at the position, and anything above or below that indicates above or below average production).

Then I repeated the same Win Score calculations, but this time using each Celtics regular season averages. I then took those results and multiplied them by the player's postseason percentage of minutes played.

What I was left with was a comparison between the offensive and defensive Win Contributions each player was making in the playoffs and the Win Contribution they would be making if they were producing like they did in the regular season.

Click here to see my results

Technically, its Pierce and Powe

According to my calculations, the biggest difference between the postseason Celtics and the regular season Celtics has been the dropoff in offensive production from Paul Pierce and, surprisingly, Leon Powe. If those two players were playing with the efficiency and productivity they played with during the regular season, then I believe the Celtics would be winning at the same rate they did during the regular season.

Remember, my conclusions are all relative. Of course Ray Allen's offensive production has been worse than either Pierce or Powe, but because his regular season contributions were not as great as theirs, his decline has not had the same relative impact as theirs has.

Defensive Win Score and the NBA All-Defensive Team

If you follow this blog, you will know that I have for some time believed you can pretty accurately quantify a player's defensive contribution to his team's success by simply taking Professor Berri's Win Score efficiency metric and rather than applying it to the player himself (as is custom), instead applying it to the player's collective "counterparts" -- ie those opponents he was assigned to guard throughout the season. I refer to this calculation as the player's "Defensive Win Score".

(The logic goes like this. If traditional Win Score shows how well the player did at producing statistics that correlate with victory, then Defensive Win Score should show how well the player did at preventing his assigned opponents from producing those same statistics... in other words, how well he played defense.)

Anyway, last night I painstakingly calculated the "Defensive Win Score" averages for each position on every team. They are in raw form, but this year's overall positional averages are listed at the top of every positional column. By subtracting the average from the team's positional total, and then multiplying by .20 (1/5th of all playing time) you can get an idea about the defensive win contribution each team received at each position. (note: you will notice the backcourt positions provided the Bucks with the most negative defensive win contribution of any backcourt in the NBA).

Click here for every team's Defensive Win Score averages by position

The Hidden Value of a Bill Laimbeer

Defensive Win Score is fundamentally different and broader than the traditional concept of defense. Traditional defensive evaluations myopically focus on "point prevention". But as the research in the book "The Wages of Wins" clearly demonstrates, there are many other components to victory. Defensive Win Score takes all of those various components into weighted account, and pays no mind to a player's "one-on-one" defensive technique, or shot blocking capability.

This technique leads to surprising, counter intuitive, results. Interior players who can force their counterparts to account for them on the perimeter of their defensive end -- players like Bill Laimbeer, Yi Jianlian, and Dirk Nowitzki -- have a hidden "defensive" value I never considered before I started calculating this statistic. By keeping the opposition's big men away from the defensive glass they simultaneously prevent one of the opposition's best "possession enders" from ending possessions. That can be considered a form of defense -- it extends their teams' offense.

That's why if you look at the numbers, Yi and Nowitzki both have excellent Defensive Win Scores, even though neither would be considered a "glove-like" defender by any standard. Both hold opposition power forwards well below their "per 48" rebounding averages. And once Yi becomes a better defensive rebounder himself, his advantage will multiply -- he will be on the defensive boards while simultaneously keeping his counterpart off the Milwaukee offensive glass. Maybe the idea of keeping Yi at power forward deserves a second look.

Defensive Win Score and the NBA All-Defensive Team

Based on my findings, I have to take two exceptions with the NBA All-Defensive team. Based on their Defensive Win Scores, I don't think Bruce Bowen or Marcus Camby deserve to be on the team.

In my mind, Bruce Bowen's value to the Spurs is significantly overstated. He is on the floor strictly for his defensive contributions, yet if you quantify those contributions according to Defensive Win Score, he actually makes one of the smallest defensive win contributions on the team (-0.082). That's just below average (with average being +0.000), but it goes without saying it is not up to All-Defensive team standards. According to defensive win contributions, which is equal to Defensive Win Score above average multiplied by the player's percentage of overall playing time, Bowen's spot rightly belongs to Paul Pierce, the NBA's Defensive Win Score "Player of the Year". (With a Defensive Win Contribution of +0.569, I estimate Pierce's defense alone added 4 more victories to the Celtic win column than the average player would have added in the same amount of playing time and given the same positions).

The second mistake selection based on reputation is Denver center Marcus Camby. By Defensive Win Score calculation he is one of the worst defensive centers in the game (-0.331)! His addition to the All-Defensive team is based, I'm assuming, on the mistaken belief that blocked shots equal good defense. They don't (necessarily). Focusing solely on Camby's blocked shot totals ignores the costly trade offs he makes to achieve those blocked shots.

By attempting to block everything in his sight, Camby effectively turns his counterpart centers completely loose. Indeed, when matched against Camby, NBA centers grabbed significantly more rebounds per 48 (particularly offensive rebounds -- supporting my "he turned them loose" hypothesis), shot a higher percentage from the field, and committed fewer turnovers.

And, there is no evidence Camby's shot blocking had any chilling effect at all on the other team's shooters. Denver's opponents had a better effective FG% with Camby on the court than they did with Camby on the bench.

That all being said (or written), here is the NBA All-Defensive team if I were choosing.

Bucks Diary's "Defensive Win Score" NBA All-Defensive Team

First Team

PG-- Deron Williams, Utah Jazz (dwc: +0.374)
SG-- Tracy McGrady, Houston Rockets (dwc: +0.471)
SF-- Paul Pierce, Boston Celtics (dwc: +0.569)
PF-- Kevin Garnett, Boston Celtics (dwc: +0.378)
C-- Dwight Howard, Orlando Magic (dwc: +0.484)

Second Team

PG-- Chauncey Billups, Detroit Pistons (+0.315)

SG-- Kobe Bryant, LA Lakers (+0.405)

SF-- LeBron James, Cleveland Cavaliers (+0.225)

PF-- Dirk Nowitzki, Dallas Mavericks (+0.326)

C-- Chris Bosh, Toronto Raptors (+0.329)

"Madison" Bucks and "Providence" Celtics: How NBA history explains home court advantage

The overriding story of this NBA playoff season has been the dramatic advantage the home team has held in nearly every contest. But what exactly explains it?

Celtics fan John Swansburg addresses that very question in a recent posting on Slate.com. After implying that the question might have no answer, he cites the four most plausible explanantions:

1. Its the building

2. Its the crowd

3. Its the refs

4. Its the travel

Ironically, had I written this post about six months ago, I would have argued vehemently that the answer had to be either (1) or (4), or a combination of both. But after researching the issue on this fabulous statistical resource site, I am now absolutely convinced by historical evidence that it is neither (1) nor (4). It almost certainly has to be (2), and probably also (3) being impacted by (2).

The NBA's forgotten "Neutral Site" Era

Those who know NBA history will remember what I call the "neutral site" schedule era. It spanned the early years of NBA history and ended following the 1973-74 season. I'm sure it served to nationalize the game in the days when the game was extremely limited in its geographic reach.

For whatever reason it existed, its peculiarity and inconsistent application provides valuable insight into the causes of the homecourt advantage in basketball. If you study the era carefully, you will find clear evidence that partisan crowds, as determined by geographic proximity to the team's home city, produced win advantages quite similar to those acheived at each teams home arena.

Of "Madison" Bucks and "Providence" Celtics

Look at this chart I made. It illustrates the impact of crowd partisanship on game results. The chart breaks down the records of 4 teams across different seasons: the Boston Celtics, Milwaukee Bucks, KC/Omaha Kings, and the Houston Rockets. Each of those teams had identifiable "semi-home" games on their schedules during the seasons sited (most obviously Kansas City/Omaha -- the only team in NBA history with two acknowledged "homes"). As you will notice, each of the team's "semi-home" records over the given timeframes significantly exceed their overall records and practically mirror their home records.

You will notice I also cited a fifth team without any "semi-home" record. From 1960-1969, the Los Angeles Lakers played a "pure" neutral site schedule. By that I mean, none of their neutral site games were played anywhere near Los Angeles or the opponents home city. And as you will notice, their neutral site record over that time parallels precisely their overall record, indicating neither an advantage nor a disadvantage in any of their neutral site outcomes.

All of which would tend to eliminate (1) and (4) as plausible explanations. The teams that played "semi-home" games played so few of them that the "semi-home" arenas were no more familiar to them than they were to they were to their opponents. So (1) can't be true. And, all four teams had to travel to their "semi-home" destinations (two of them out-of-state) and that had no adverse effect.

CONCLUSION

The home court advantage in basketball is very significant and very real. And it is almost certainly a product of crowd partisanship. How the partisanship actually manifests itself, I cannot say.

But the explanation is almost certainly psychological. Anyone who has performed in an indoor spectator sport and has "felt" the roar of a partisan crowd... or the baying of a hostile mob... will concur that the first can be unbelievably uplifting, and the second quite disconcerting. And your concentration, your effort, and even your "comfort" level is effected accordingly. (The same, I believe, impacts the judgment of the referees -- its human nature). And in basketball, all of those things combine to dramatically tilt the advantage to the home team.

Stay tuned for my future post, which builds on this post and asks the following question: "How much home court advantage did the Bucks leave at the old Milwaukee Arena?" Hint: What year did Bucks history take a turn for the worst? What event occured the year before?

I hope Bucks' GM Hammond is kidding

I don't like some of the comments I read from the Bucks new GM John Hammond in an interview with the Racine Journal Times. In the interview, Hammond essentially repeats the delusional "the problem was underachievement" thesis that former GM Larry Harris was babbling to himself as Bradley Center security escorted him out the doors of 1001 Fourth Street.

Here's the specific Hammond quote I refer to:

"I think what I would say about this team is probably what any coach here last year or any player that was here last year would say and that is they underachieved"

He later proceeded to basically blame the team's woes on Larry Krystkowiak. Hammond threw Krystkowiak under... well not a bus... it was more like one of those huge troop transporter planes. To make the point even clearer, he alluded to the fact that he "wasn't blaming" Coach K. Uh-huh. This is not the frank assessment I wanted to hear from the new leader of BucksNation. Its ridiculous on its face.

Underachieved? Maybe some of them technically did, but that's kind of like saying that Poland underachieved in World War II. Its irrelevant. Even their best wouldn't have been near good enough.

That's why I wish when someone makes the "underachievement" argument they would point out which specific players performed below their career norms, and exactly how many wins that cost the Bucks. Once you move away from abstractions, the argument falls apart. You can't make a rational case that the existing Bucks roster, with each player producing at his career norms, would have been anywhere near a winning team.

But, I'm going to give Hammond the benefit of the doubt. I am going to assume he's just putting lipstick on the pig he will probably have to sell at public auction next season. It may very well be that Hammond realizes it will take him a couple of years at least to get rid of some of the past regimes long-term mistakes.

Indeed, that is the view espoused by Bucks announcer Ted Davis. He believes there really isn't much Hammond can do immediately to revamp the roster. He will have to wait until some of the more foolish contract obligations the Bucks made finally expire. Davis believes, however, that either Michael Redd or Mo Williams will be traded before next season, with Redd being the more saleable commodity (even with his massive contract).

Comparing the potential of Derrick Rose and Michael Beasley

Since the Bucks reside in the sweet spot for winning the lottery (I'm kidding... but doesn't it seem like the 7th or 8th place team always ends up winning?), who would they take if they had to choose between the consensus top pick candidates? ESPN's Chad Ford believes it would be Memphis PG Derrick Rose (the alternative, of course, is Kansas PF Michael Beasley).

Ford's logic: He believes new Bucks GM John Hammond would not pass on a "franchise" point guard if given the opportunity to choose one. He also believes the Bucks would not draft a power forward two years in a row.

Shouldn't let your past picks adjust your draft board

All right, before I evaluate the two prospects, let me say I hope John Hammond takes no account of the Bucks drafting history when making his selection.

If NBA draft history has taught us anything, it has taught us that passing on a better player because you just picked that position in a recent draft is one of the surest roads to regret. Look at recent Bucks history. Do you think the Bucks regret passing on Chris Paul and Deron Williams? Yet they never even considered drafting either point guard because they just spent a lottery pick on TJ Ford. Or how about the all-time classic example: Sam Bowie over Michael Jordan. The Blazers passed on Jordan because they just drafted a player at Jordan's position (Clyde Drexler) the season before.

Rose vs. Beasley: Its a close call

Between Derrick Rose and Michael Beasley, who projects as the better professional player?

If you go strictly by college offensive Win Score, the answer is probably Michael Beasley. The average professional retention rate is around 63%. So Beasley's college performance projects to an NBA average Win Score of 14.7, which would be superlative. Rose's college performance, on the other hand, projects to about 6.4, which would be slightly below average for a point guard.

But two things make the 63% standard uncertain for these two prospects. One is Beasley's size. It indicates he might do worse. The other is Rose's position. It indicates he could do better.

In the few instances where players' college Win Scores drop way off of their college production, the player's size (meaning height and/or weight) relative to the average at the player's position is usually an issue. Specific to Beasley, his weight/height mix leaves him in the danger zone for a power forward, especially his weight (because his college numbers are so heavily dependent on his extraordinary collegiate rebounding). I've found that a big man's relative weight is an excellent predictor of his likely professional rebounding production, but that it can be overcome by extraordinary height (which Beasley does not possess).

Now, if you project Beasley at small forward, its a different story. His size for that position is ideal. (But would he be able to guard anybody there?) Either way, though, I don't see how Beasley can be expected to produce anything less than 56% of his college numbers, which would be a Win Score of about 12.1. That would be a Win Score over positional average of +2.1 at power forward and about +5.6 at small forward.

As for Rose, his numbers could be potentially greater than 63% of his college numbers. Point guards, once in a while, will outperform the 63% standard.

And if you look at analagous point guards, it seems Rose is almost likely to do better. My comparative choices are Deron Williams of Utah, Jason Kidd of the Dallas Mavericks, and Baron Davis of the Golden State Warriors. All 3 players have similar size and playing styles to Rose.

If the professional results of those 3 are instructive, we can project Rose to produce 83% of his college Win Score, or 8.5. I say that because that's precisely what the three similar point guards have produced. Deron Williams college Win Score was 7.7. Thus far his NBA career Win Score is 6.1, which is roughly 83% of his college performance. Jason Kidd's college Win Score was 14.1, and his career NBA Win Score has been 11.8. Again, roughly 83% of his college performance. And Baron Davis' college Win Score was 9.1, and his NBA Win Score has been 7.1. That's 83% almost on the dot. Amazing, but true.

If that holds for Rose, then Rose will produce a +2.2 Win Score over position on the offensive end. Very good numbers.

Can't say about either player's defense, though

None of this, of course, takes into account defense. That analysis would be purely subjective. But from what I saw in the NCAA tournament, Rose seems to be the better defensive prospect of the two.

Conclusion

So, in short, if you are going for the home run, Michael Beasley would be the pick. If he hangs onto the normal amount of his college production, he will be a big time offensive producer. But his risks are greater, because of his size and his uncertain defensive adjustment.

If you want the surer thing, then, Rose is the pick. His size is excellent, and his defensive instincts indicate he will do fine on that end. Plus, if the history of similar point guards is instructive, he will also be an above average player on the offensive end (though probably not right away).